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1Opportunistic Distributed Channel Access for a
Dense Wireless Small-Cell Zone
Mathew Goonewardena1, Animesh Yadav, Wessam Ajib, and Halima Elbiaze
Abstract—This paper considers uplink channel access in a
zone of closed-access small-cells that is deployed in a macrocell
service area. All small-cell user equipments (SUEs) have access
to a common orthogonal set of channels, leading to intercell
interference. In addition, each channel forms a separate collision
domain in each cell, thus can be successfully used only by
one SUE of that cell. This paper proposes two noncooperative
Bayesian games, G1 and G2, that are played among the SUEs.
G1 assumes the availability of channel state information (CSI)
at the transmitters while G2 assumes the availability of only
the distribution of the CSI. Each SUE can choose to transmit
over one of the channels or not to transmit. The emphasis of
the paper is on the set of symmetric threshold strategies where
the Nash equilibrium is fully determined by a single parameter.
The existence and uniqueness of pure Bayesian-Nash symmetric
equilibrium (BNSE) of G1 in threshold strategies and mixed
BNSE of G2 in uniformly distributed threshold strategies are
proven. Numerical results corroborate the theoretical findings
and benchmark against another decentralized scheme.
Index Terms—Small-cells, distributed uplink access, Bayesian
games, stochastic coupling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Small-cells (SCs) are introduced to improve the coverage
and meet the increasing demand for throughput of indoor
users. They are low-power, cost-effective, and short-range
radio access networks. The throughput is improved due to
the reduced link distance and improved channel between
the indoor located user equipments (UEs) and the small-cell
access point (SAP). SCs include microcells, picocells, and
femtocells [1]. A UE connected to an SAP is called a small-
cell user equipment (SUE). In an underlay deployment, SCs
have access to the same spectrum as the existing macrocell.
A wireless network with co-existing macrocells and SCs is
called a heterogeneous small-cell network (HetSNet). In a
HetSNet, intercell interference is a key limiting factor [2].
Centralized coordinated scheduling of SUEs among multiple
SAPs is optimal for interference mitigation, but such a scheme
requires extensive global channel state information (CSI) of
all the UEs. Acquisition of time-varying global CSI involves
a large signaling overhead, which renders centralized schemes
less practical. Therefore, distributed interference management
with low-signaling in HetSNets is a true challenge [3]. Non-
cooperative-game theory is one of the tools employed in this
domain [4].
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Interference mitigation schemes that use game theoretic
tools are being developed in recent work. A potential-game-
theoretic [4] solution for intracell interference mitigation in
a cognitive radio network (CRN) through combined power
allocation and base station association is considered in [5].
Another potential-game is introduced in [6] for the problem
of uplink channel and power allocation in a multicell environ-
ment. In a potential game, the convergence time to equilibrium
can be large and best response dynamics generally require
the knowledge of current action profile at each player. For
a detailed study of potential games in wireless networks the
reader is referred to [7]. In [8], a concave game is proposed
for a set of interfering orthogonal frequency division multiplex
(OFDM) transmit-receive pairs. In a concave game, the action
set of each player is compact and convex, the utility of a player
is continuous in the action profile and is quasi-concave in its
own action [9]. The strategy space of the transmitters is the
rate assignment over the set of OFDM channels. Finding the
Nash equilibrium (NE) in a concave game requires extensive
information sharing between players.
Multi-user channel access games are also addressed in
relation to medium access control (MAC) protocol design.
This approach is taken in random access networks, such as
ad-hoc, ALOHA, and carrier sense multiple access (CSMA).
A game theory inspired MAC protocol for the interference
channel is designed in [10]. In [11], an uplink channel access
game is proposed for a set of co-located transmit-receive
pairs over a single channel. They consider a collision-domain
approach, instead of interference, and present a mixed-strategy
nonsymmetric equilibrium. Likewise authors in [12] assume
a collision-domain and model the access probability design
as a continuous-action-space game. In the ALOHA setting, a
noncooperative game is designed in [13], where the strategy
space is the probability of transmission. In [14], a mobile ad-
hoc network where nodes follow slotted ALOHA protocol is
considered and they develop a game for the channel access
probability at the symmetric NE.
A. Related Work
This paper explores orthogonal channel access in a dense
cluster of SCs. Application of game theory for channel access
in multichannel case appears in orthogonal frequency division
multiple access (OFDMA) networks. In [15], subchannel allo-
cation in a OFDMA based network is considered as a potential
game. The utility of a player is a function of interference. An
uplink power allocation game among UEs is analyzed in [16].
Interference is controlled through a quadratic cost function
on transmitted power. In [17], uplink channel allocation in
2an OFDMA multicell system is formulated and solved for
the correlated equilibrium (CE). In [18], a distributed cell
selection and resource allocation scheme that is performed by
UEs is presented. It is a two stage game. A UE first selects
the cell and then selects the radio resource. In [19], resource
allocation problem of the OFDMA downlink is addressed in
the context of mechanism design. The authors demonstrate that
the problem is NP-hard and provide an α-optimal solution. In
a multiple femtocell scenario, an OFDMA based downlink
power allocation with interference constraints is considered in
[20], as a generalized NE problem. In [21], a threshold strategy
based game in a multichannel environment is presented. A
threshold strategy of a player is defined by a single parameter.
The above discussed research consider games that require
complete CSI. Therefore, even if a NE exists they have limited
practical applicability as an individual player in a wireless
network is unlikely to possess full knowledge of the network.
Also there is the question of multiple NEs. The incomplete
CSI case is taken into consideration through Bayesian games
in [22]. Therein, power allocation for transmit-receive pairs
over a multichannel system with interference is considered.
The authors prove that spreading power equally among the
flat fading channels is a pure-strategy NE. The Bayesian
symmetric games in [23]–[25] consider threshold strategies in
a single channel wireless network. The channel access model
in [23], [24] is a single collision domain and a single access
point (AP). In [25], the work of [23] is extended to multiple
APs with intercell interference.
A key limitation of applying game theory to design dis-
tributed solutions is the complexity in finding the NE. It has
been proven, that even for a two player game finding the NE
is PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs)
complete [26]. Therefore, we motivate a symmetric game
which possesses NE that is computable individually by each
player as the unique root of a function [23]. In a symmetric
game the utility of a player, given the action profile of other
players, is independent of the player [4]. This paper considers
the orthogonal multichannel uplink transmission in a dense
zone of SCs. The qualifier dense, in the context of this paper,
means that the coverage areas of the SCs overlap with each
other. That is, as opposed to sparse deployment where SCs
are deployed far apart as to not interfere with each other [27].
The qualifier zone, in the context of this paper, means that
the set of SCs in consideration is confined to a localized area
that is small relative to the macrocell coverage area. Examples
of dense zones of SCs are convention centres, hotel lobbies
or shopping malls, where more than one telecommunication
service providers maintain picocells, each for their own users.
Thus it is important to this research that a dense zone of SCs
is not understood as a large number of SCs, rather it is an
overlapping localized deployment. Fig. 1 depicts a dense zone
of SCs. In such a dense deployment, cochannel interference
between SCs is a key limitation and opportunistic channel
access has been proposed as a solution [28]. In opportunistic
channel access, an SUE exploits the fading of the channels
to judiciously access, while its own channel gain is relatively
higher in comparison to the interference [29].
B. Contributions and Organization of the Paper
The objective of this paper is to propose low complexity,
decentralized-opportunistic channel access schemes based on
Bayesian games. To that end, the paper considers symmetric
threshold strategies; those that are defined by a single parame-
ter [21], [23]. Two uplink channel access games are discussed.
The first game G1, considers the case where each SUE knows
its CSI. This situation is identified in literature as channel state
information available at the transmitter (CSIT). The second
game G2, considers the case where each SUE has statistical
knowledge of its CSI (statistical-CSIT). In this paper:
• we bring together in a game model; multiple chan-
nels, intracell per-channel collision domains, inter-SC
and macrocell-SC interference, and random symbol avail-
ability at the SUEs which are well identified resource
allocation constraints in an SC deployment.
• we prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy
Bayesian-Nash symmetric equilibrium (BNSE) in thresh-
old strategies for game G1 with CSIT.
• we prove the existence of a unique mixed-strategy BNSE
in uniformly distributed threshold strategies for game G2
with statistical-CSIT.
• we corroborate the theoretical results through numerical
simulations and compare against a locally optimal scheme
where each SC schedules the SUE with highest channel
gain.
The pure-strategy BNSE proved in G1 is an extension of the
single channel result of [25] to a multichannel case. However,
the extension is nontrivial and the proof method is novel, in
that we employ stochastic coupling theory [30]. The mixed-
strategy BNSE proved in G2 for statistical-CSIT is novel in SC
research to the best of our knowledge. The advantage of BNSE
in threshold strategies is that each player is independently able
to find the equilibrium without message passing. However its
applicability is limited to symmetric players, which is a fair
approximation of a dense SC zone as justified in the following
sections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
assumptions and system model are detailed in Section II.
Development of game G1 for CSIT is presented in Section
III, and Section IV solves it. Development of game G2 for
statistical-CSIT and its solution is presented in Section V.
Numerical results and a discussion on non-symmetric case is
presented in Section VI and finally Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This paper considers the uplink access in a dense zone of
SCs that is underlayed in a single macrocell coverage area.
Each SAP forms a single SC and hence SAP and SC are
synonymous. As was defined in Section I, a dense SC zone
is a set of SAPs that is deployed in a confined area having
overlapping coverage. For example a convention centre where
more than one operator maintain picocells. Fig. 1 depicts an
example dense zone of SCs. The set of SAPs is M. Let N
denote the set of SUEs and K the set of orthogonal channels
whose cardinalities are given by N and K, respectively. The
3Table I: Notation summary
Symbol(s) Description
M, N , K, set of SAP, SUE, and channels with
cardinality M , N , and K
Nm, N−m set of SUEs of SAP m and set of
SUEs not of SAP m
Nbik set of SUEs except i ∈ Nbi of SAP bi
that transmits on channel k
N−mk set of SUEs not of SAP m that
transmits on channel k
N ′−mk set of SUEs not of SAP m that does
not transmit on channel k
Ai, A−i,A action set of SUE i, product set∏
j∈Nr{i}Aj , and
∏
j∈N Aj
Θi, Θ−i, Θ of game G1- type set of SUE i,
product set
∏
j∈Nr{i}Θj , and∏
j∈NΘj
Ωi, Ω−i, Ω of game G2- type set of SUE i,
product set
∏
j∈Nr{i}Ωj , and∏
j∈NΩj
αi random symbol availability indicator
of SUE i
hki channel power gain of SUE i to
home-SAP on channel k
gkjm interference channel power gain of a
UE j to SAP m on channel k
γkm sum of noise power of MUEs at SAP
m on channel k
fhki
, fgkim , fαi , fγ probability densities of h
k
i , g
k
im, αi,
and γkm
f¯θ−i , f¯ω−i belief densities of SUE i over set
Θ−i and Ω−i
ui utility of player i
si, ri pure and mixed strategy of SUE i
s−i, r−i pure and mixed strategies of SUEs
except i
hith, λith threshold of SUE i in game G1 and
G2
q1, q2 probability that an SUE transmits on
channel k in game G1 and G2
p¯l (Nbik), p¯l
(N ′−bik) probability that SUEs Nbik and
N−bik do not transmit on channel k,
of game Gl (l ∈ {1, 2})
pl (N−bik) probability that SUEs N−bik transmit
on channel k, of game Gl
(l ∈ {1, 2})
Bl (N,p) of game Gl (l ∈ {1, 2}) binomial
distribution with N trials and success
probability p
E, Pr, P expectation, probability, and power set
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Figure 1: A scenario illustrating a dense zone of SCs where 4
operators serve a commercial building. A ? denotes an SAP, •
denotes an SUE, N denotes the macrocell base station (BS) 
denotes an macrocell UE (MUE). The colors match the SUEs
to home-SAPs.
set of macrocell user equipments (MUEs) is denoted by N.
Each SAP m ∈M operates in closed-access mode and hence
is accessible only by SUEs that are in its access list and they
are called the home-SUEs of that SAP [31]. We assume that
an SUE i can only be in the access list of only one SAP, which
is called its home-SAP and denoted by bi ∈ M. The set of
home-SUEs of SAP m is denoted by Nm and its complement
byN−m. Narrow-band single tap Rayleigh fading channels are
assumed in this paper. Then the baseband equivalent received
signal ykm, at SAP m on channel k ∈ K is,
ykm =
∑
i∈Nm
h¯ki x
k
i +
∑
j∈N−m
g¯kjmx
k
j +
∑
l∈N
g¯klmx
k
l + n
k
m, (1)
where h¯ki is the complex channel gain from SUE i to its home-
SAP m on channel k. The complex interference gain from a
UE (can be an SUE or an MUE) j ∈ N−m ∪ N to SAP
m on channel k is denoted by g¯kjm [29]. The corresponding
channel power gains are denoted by hki :=
∣∣h¯ki ∣∣2, gkim :=∣∣g¯kjm∣∣2 and they follow exponential distribution. The complex
valued transmit symbols of a UE j ∈ N ∪N on channel k is
denoted by xkj . The circular symmetric complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and σ2 variance is
denoted by nkm. The second right hand term of (1) is the sum
interference from the SUEs that belongs to SAPs other than
m. The third term is the sum interference from the MUEs.
Note that although we sum over all UEs, if a UE j does not
transmit, the respective symbol xkj is 0. In order to enhance
the readability we summarize key notations in Table I.
In the following development, the number of SUEs in
each SC is set to a constant with probability one. However
the results derived in the paper apply to independently and
identically populated SC with finite number of SUEs as well.
This extension is detailed in Section VI-B and an example
is provided there. In practice, this corresponds to a situation
where the SAP operators have equal market share. Unlike in
4macrocells, in SCs all home-SUEs lie sufficiently close to the
home-SAP so that no power control is needed and therefore
SUEs transmit at constant normalized unit power [32].
The load of the MUEs is assumed to be balanced in distribu-
tion over the set of channels K, which is realistic as the channel
gains are random and there is a large number of MUEs. From
the above assumption and since the SAPs in the zone are
close to each other with respect to the coverage area of the
macrocell, the sum of MUE interference received at each SAP
can be modeled by identically distributed random variables
[33]. In other words, defining γkm :=
∑
l∈N g
k
lm with the
probability density fγkm , we have that fγkm = fγk′m′ = fγ , ∀
k, k′ ∈ K ∀ m,m′ ∈M. The distribution fγ can be estimated
through cognitive features in SCs and the errors associated
with estimation are disregarded in this research [34]. The
symbol availability at an SUE i is denoted by the Boolean
random variable αi. If a symbol is available then αi = 1
otherwise 0.
III. DESIGN OF G1 : A GAME WITH CSIT
This section defines the components of the Bayesian game
with CSIT. The set of players are the SUEs. By the defi-
nition of CSIT, each SUE i possess perfect information of(
hki , k ∈ K
)
and it also knows the realization of αi. The
actions available for an SUE are: transmit on a channel k
denoted by Tk and the action of “do not transmit” denoted
by X. Then the action set of SUE i is Ai := {X, T1, . . . , TK}.
We define the joint action spaces by A := ∏
i∈N
Ai such that
a ∈ A and A−i :=
∏
j∈Nr{i}
Aj such that a−i ∈ A−i. The
MUEs do not take part in the game, but exogenously affect
the outcome through interference.
A. Symmetric-Independent Types
Type of a player in a Bayesian games is the pri-
vate information of that player [4]. In our system model,
the private information available at SUE i is its channel
power gains to the home-SAP and its symbol availability.
We define a single private information vector θi, called
the type vector, containing all private information, θi :=
(
(
hki
)
k∈K ,
(
gkim
)
k∈K,m∈Mr{bi} , αi). The type set is denoted
by Θi such that θi ∈ Θi. We also define the type set product
Θ :=
∏
i∈N
Θi such that θ ∈ Θ and Θ−i :=
∏
j∈Nr{i}
Θj such
that θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Let the probability densities of hki , g
k
im, and αi, be fhki ,
fgkim , and fαi , respectively. Then the belief that SUE i holds
about the types of other players θ−i is given by the density
function fθ−i =
∏
k∈K
j∈Nr{i}
(fhkj
· fgkjm ) ·
∏
j∈Nr{i}
fαj . The paper
also consider i.i.d. symbol availability among SUEs, which
implies that they have demands identical in distribution, hence
fαi = fα, ∀ i ∈ N . Recall from Section II that the SCs
lie in a dense confined zone. Therefore, all the SUEs lie
close to the SAPs and experience a similar scattering environ-
ment. As such, we assume that all players hold independent
and identical beliefs about each others channels, which in
Bayesian games is called symmetric-independent types [4].
From symmetric-independent types, fhki = fh and fgkim = fg∀i ∈ N , ∀m ∈M, and ∀k ∈ K.
B. Utility Design
The utility of player i is a function ui : A × Θ → R.
When αi = 0, SUE i does not possess a symbol and hence
the utility is zero. This paper models each channel on each
SAP as a separate collision domain. This implies that if more
than one home-SUE of a given SAP transmits simultaneously
on the same channel, all those SUEs obtain a zero utility
due to collision. It is important to emphasize that the SUEs
from different SAPs may transmit simultaneously over the
same channel. Home-SUEs of a given SAP may transmit
simultaneously and not experience collisions as long as they
employ different channels.
However, to obtain a positive rate, avoiding a collision
is not sufficient. The signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) needs to be above a detectable threshold Γth as well
[28]. Let Nbik denote the set of the home-SUEs of SAP
bi except SUE i , that transmits on channel k. Let N−bik
denote the set of SUEs of SAPs M r {bi} that transmits on
channel k. Their cardinalities are denoted by Nbik and N−bik
respectively. According to the above discussion, we define the
utility ui (a,θ) , as follows. If SUE i does not transmit
ui (X,a−i,θ) =
{
ρ ifαi = 1,
0 elseαi = 0,
(2)
where the modeling parameter ρ ∈ R is an incentive given to
the player.
For the notational convenience, as the SAP in discussion is
clear, subscript m is omitted and gkjm simplifies to g
k
j , while
γkm simplifies to γk. If SUE i has αi = 1, and transmits
successfully on channel k, i.e., obtains SINR ≥ Γth, and
Nbik = 0, then
ui (Tk,a−i,θ) = log
(
1 +
hki∑
j∈N−bik
gkj + γk + σ
2
)
. (3)
Otherwise, if SUE i has αi = 1, and transmits unsuccessfully
on channel k, i.e., obtains SINR < Γth or Nbik 6= 0, then
ui (Tk,a−i,θ) = 0. (4)
C. Definition of Game G1
A game in normal form is defined by the set of players,
action set of each player and utility of each player. In addition,
when the game is Bayesian, we need to specify the type set
and belief of each player and finally the system state that is
given by the external random variables that affect the utilities.
Players N
Action ai ∈ Ai
Type θi ∈ Θi
Belief fθ−i over Θ−i
System state γkm ∀ k ∈ K, m ∈M
Payoff ui (a,θ), a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ
5In this paper the pairs of terms “player”-“SUE” and
“payoff”-“utility” are synonymously used.
IV. SYMMETRIC-THRESHOLD EQUILIBRIUM OF G1
The ex interim expected utility of player i ∈ N is defined as,
Eγθ−i|θiui [35]. From the independence of random variables
in symmetric-independent types, the conditional expectation
Eγθ−i|θi simplifies to Eγθ−i . For brevity, the rest of the paper
refers to ex interim expected utility as the expected utility.
Next we introduce the standard definitions of pure strategies,
best response (BR) strategy, and Bayesian-Nash equilibria [4],
[35].
Definition 1. In a Bayesian game a pure strategy of a player
i is a relation si : Θi → Ai.
Following standard game-theoretic notation, the strategy
vector of all players except SUE i is denoted by s−i :=
(sj , j ∈ N r {i}) and the strategy profile of all players is
denoted by s := (si, i ∈ N ).
Definition 2. Given strategy vector s−i, a BR strategy of
player i, denoted by s˜i, is given by
s˜i (θi) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
{
Eγθ−iui (si (θi) , s−i,θ)
}
, ∀θi ∈ Θi.
According to Definition 2, a strategy is a BR if the player
cannot obtain a higher payoff by another strategy for any of
its types.
Definition 3. The strategy profile s˜ := (s˜i, i ∈ N ) is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if s˜i is a BR strategy for s˜−i
∀i ∈ N .
A. Threshold Strategies
This paper considers threshold strategies. Such strategies
form a subset of the feasible strategies of the game. We define
the threshold strategy of SUE i as follows:
sith (θi) :=
Tk ifαi = 1, hki = maxk′∈K
{
hk
′
i
}
≥ hith,
X otherwise,
(5)
where hith is a non-negative real valued parameter. The
threshold-strategy definition (5) states that a player transmits
on channel k if the channel power gain hki is the largest among
all the channels and hki is greater than a threshold hith. As a
consequence of the special form of threshold strategies, we can
denote the strategy profile of the players by simply specifying
their threshold vector sth := (hith, i ∈ N ). Similarly, the
threshold strategy vector of all players except i is denoted by
s−ith = (hjth, j ∈ Nr{i}). If the threshold is symmetric, i.e.,
common to all players, then we denote the strategy profile by
ssymth := (hth). Since we search for a unique BNSE in threshold
strategies, according to Definition 3, our goal is to demonstrate
that there is a unique threshold hith = h˜th ∀ i ∈ N such that
ssymth = (h˜th) is a mutual BR strategy profile. The question
is weather the strategy space defined by (5) is large enough
to contain a NE. We answer this question positively in the
following.
When SUE i plays the threshold strategy (5) the probability
that it transmits on channel k is,
qki (hith) = Pr
(
αj = 1, h
k
i = max
k′∈K
{
hk
′
i
}
, hki ≥ hith
)
. (6)
We observe that the probability qki (hith) is decreasing in
hith. From independence of types, the probability that all the
SUEs in N ′ ⊆ N transmit on channel k is pk1 (N ′) :=∏
j∈N ′ q
k
j (hjth), and the probability that none of the SUEs in
N ′ transmit on k is p¯k1 (N ′) :=
∏
j∈N ′
(
1− qkj (hjth)
)
. Let
N ′−bik denote the set of SUEs that belong to SAPs other than
bi and that does not transmit on channel k. The probability that
i does not encounter a collision on k is p¯k1 (Nbi r {i}) . The
probability that the set N−bik transmits is pk1 (N−bik) and the
probability that the set N ′−bik does not transmit on channel
k is p¯k1
(N ′−bik). These probabilities are used to define the
expected utility.
The expected utility of player i when αi = 1 and ai = Tk
is denoted by Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
and is given by (7). The
power set of N−bi is denoted by P (N−bi). The integration
region D is {(gkjbi , j ∈ N−bik), γk :
hki∑
j∈N−bik
gkj+γk+σ
2 ≥ Γth}
and fg is the probability density of the random variable vector(
gkj , j ∈ N−bik
)
.
Claim 1. When αi = 1, for symmetric-independent types and
strategy vector s−ith, it holds that
arg max
k∈K
{
Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)}
= arg max
k∈K
{
hki
}
.
Proof: By symmetric-independent types, we have that
interference channel power gains of a player j to SAP bi, given
by gkjbi are i.i.d. ∀ k ∈ K. From (6) we have that qki (hith) =
qk
′
i (hith) for k, k
′ ∈ K. Then from (7) we have that hki ≥ hk
′
i
implies Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
) ≥ Eγθ−iui (hk′i , s−ith,θ).
Therefore, selecting the channel with best expected payoff is
equivalent to selecting the channel with the highest channel
power gain.
Claim 1 essentially says that the sub-strategy space defined
by (5) is large enough to contain a BR to itself. That is when
players N r {i} follow a strategy in the space defined by (5),
player i can find a BR in (5) too. Consequently, when αi = 1,
it brings down the choices of actions from set Ai, to just 2
actions, namely arg max
k∈K
{
h1i , . . . , h
K
i
}
and X. Without loss
of generality we suppose that k = arg max
k∈K
{
h1i , . . . , h
K
i
}
.
Then to select the BR between Tk and X, player i tests for
the condition Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
) ≥ Eγθ−iui (X, s−ith,θ).
If the condition is true then it chooses Tk otherwise X. The
threshold hith, that hki must exceed in order to meet the above
condition, is the solution to the following equation
Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
= Eγθ−iui (X, s−ith,θ) . (9)
By (2) we observe that the right hand side of (9) is equal
to ρ. The solution hki = hith defines the BR of player i in the
set of threshold strategies defined by (5).
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(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
= p¯k1 (Nbi r {i})
∑
pk1 (N−bik)
N−bik∈P(N−bi)
p¯k1
(N ′−bik) ˆ
D
fgfγ log
(
1 +
hki∑
j∈N−bik
gkj + γk + σ
2
)
dgdγ. (7)
Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= p¯sym1 (Nbi r {i})EX
ˆ
D
fgfγ log
(
1 +
hki∑
j∈X
gkj + γk + σ
2
)
dgdγ. (8)
In the case of symmetric-independent types and strategy
profile ssymth = (hth), the event that player i transmits on k and
the event that player j also transmits on k are independent and
have equal probabilities given by (6). Therefore, let us define
the unique probability that a player transmits on a channel by
q1 (hth) = q
k
i (hth) , ∀i ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K. (10)
From symmetric-independent types and strategy profile
ssymth = (hth), the probability that player i experiences no
collisions on channel k is given by
p¯sym1 (Nbi r {i}) = (1− q1 (hth))Nbi−1 , (11)
where Nbi is the cardinality of Nbi .
Moreover, for symmetric-independent types and strategy
profile ssymth = (hth), the probability that the subset of SUEs
N−bik ⊆ N−bi takes action Tk follows the binomial distribu-
tion of N−bik successes in a sequence of N−bi independent
binary trials with success probability of one trial given by
(10). Here N−bik and N−bi are the cardinalities of N−bik
and N−bi , respectively. We denote this binomial distribution
by B1 (N−bi , q1 (hth)) and the probability of N−bik number
of successes is denoted by pB1 (N−bik). Due to symmetric-
independent types the interference channel power gains gkj are
i.i.d. and therefore the density fg in (7) only depends on the
cardinality of the set N−bik (not on the exact SUEs in N−bik).
Next we use these observations to simplify (7) [25]. Let us
define the binomial random variable X ∼ B1 (N−bi , q1 (hth)),
then the expected utility of player i for action Tk and s
sym
−ith =
(hth) is given by (8) where
∑
j∈X
gkj is the sum of X number
of i.i.d. random variables gkj .
In order to find the symmetric BR strategy for player i, we
need to find the unique threshold h˜th such that hki = h˜th and
ssym−ith =
(
h˜th
)
solves equation (9). That is to say that
Eγθ−iui
(
h˜th, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ. (12)
Since all players follow the common threshold ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
and as player i is arbitrary, this threshold defines the symmetric
BR strategy for all players and by Definition 3 it is a unique
BNSE.
Theorem 1. For symmetric-independent types and identically
populated cells, game G1 has a unique threshold hith = h˜th
∀i ∈ N , such that the BNSE is given by the profile ssymth =(
h˜th
)
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
At the BNSE, all players follow the threshold strategy
defined by the symmetric-threshold profile ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
.
Furthermore, each player is able to calculate h˜th individually.
When ρ ≤ 0, we have h˜th = 0, hence, at all times each
SUE with a symbol available, transmits over the channel on
which it has the highest gain. On the other hand when, ρ > 0
we have h˜th > 0, therefore an SUE may not transmit, even if
a symbol is available, if its maximum channel power gain is
below the threshold. We draw the attention of the reader to
the similarity of our mechanism to that of backoff probability
in CSMA-collision detection (CD). In CSMA-CD the backoff
decision is a result of a previous collision, whereas in our
scheme the CSI determines the backoff probability.
V. DESIGN OF G2 : A GAME WITH STATISTICAL CSIT
In the previous sections we developed the BNSE in thresh-
old strategies for game G1. In G1 mixed-BNSEs do not exist
for threshold strategies of the form (5) with probability 1.
The reason being a fundamental result in game theory which
states that in a mixed-strategy NE all the actions that are
played with non zero probability must yield the same payoff
[4]. In G1, two actions Tk and Tk′ , k, k ∈ K may yield the
same expected utility if and only if (iff) hki = h
k′
i , which has
Pr
(
hki = h
k′
i
)
= 0. Similarly a player obtains equal expected
utilities for Tk and X iff hki = hith, which has zero probability
as well.
In this section we consider the situation where an SUE pos-
sesses statistical-CSIT. In (1) the channels h¯ki ∀ k ∈ K, from
SUE i to its home-SAP, are i.i.d. single tap Rayleigh. Then the
statistical knowledge an SUE i must possess is the mean λi of
the exponential power gains hki ∼ Exp
(
1
λi
)
, k ∈ K. Then the
type vector of SUE i is ωi := (λi,
(
gkim
)
k∈K,m∈Mr{bi} , αi)
and the type set is denoted by Ωi 3 ωi. We also define
the product sets Ω :=
∏
i∈N
Ωi such that ω ∈ Ω and
Ω−i :=
∏
j∈Nr{i}
Ωj such that ω−i ∈ Ω−i. In the Bayesian
setting λi is known only to player i. The other players hold
a belief of λi that we denote by the probability density fλi .
Assuming independent types, the belief player i holds about
the types of other players ω−i is given by the density function
fω−i =
∏
k∈K
j∈Nr{i}
(fλj · fgkjm ) ·
∏
j∈Nr{i}
fαj . Due to the change in
types and the beliefs of the players from those of G1 we
introduce the new game G2 as follows.
7Players N
Action ai ∈ Ai
Type ωi ∈ Ωi
Belief fω−i over Ω−i
System state γkm ∀ k ∈ K, m ∈M
Payoff ui (a,ω), a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω
Game G2 also follows the model of symmetric-independent
types that was discussed in Section III-A. Hence, λi ∀ i ∈ N
are i.i.d. Following analysis is valid for any distribution fλi
with mild conditions on the existence of finite expectation.
A. Mixed Threshold Strategies
A mixed strategy ri of a player is a probability distribution
over its pure-strategies [35]. Following the standard game-
theoretic notations the mixed-strategy vector of all players
except SUE i is denoted by, r−i := (rj , j ∈ N r {i}), and the
strategy profile of all players is denoted by r := (ri, i ∈ N ).
This section considers pure-strategies where for λi ≥ λith and
αi = 1 player i transmits on channel k ∈ K, where λith is
a threshold. If λi < λith or αi = 0, does not transmit. There
are K such pure strategies, one for each channel. There can
be various probability distributions over the K pure strategies
each of which corresponds to a mixed-strategy. Our interest
is in a special subset of the feasible mixed-strategy space.
We call this sub-strategy space uniformly distributed threshold
strategies (UDTSs). It consists of strategies of the following
form:
rith (ωi) :=
Pr (Tk) =
1
K
,Pr (X) = 0 ifαi = 1, λi ≥ λith
Pr (Tk) = 0,Pr (X) = 1 otherwise.
(13)
The strategy (13) essentially means that an SUE i picks a
channel uniformly at random, if λi ≥ λith and αi = 1.
Otherwise it does not transmit. Thus a UDTS of a player i is
completely characterized by the threshold λith. Thus in order
to specify the strategy profile of the players, it is sufficient to
provide the threshold vector. Let us define rth := (λith, i ∈ N )
and r−ith := (λjth, j ∈ N r {i}).
By (13) and i.i.d. channels, the probability that player i
transmits on channel k is
qki (λith) =
1
K
Pr (λi ≥ λith, αi = 1) . (14)
We observe that qki (λith) is decreasing in λith. Due to in-
dependence of types, the probability that a subset of SUEs
N ′ ⊂ N takes action Tk is pk2 (N ′) :=
∏
j∈N ′ q
k
j (λjth)
and the probability that none of the SUEs in N ′ takes action
Tk is p¯k2 (N ′) :=
∏
j∈N ′
(
1− qkj (λjth)
)
. These probabilities
are next used to define the expected utility. The expected
utility of i when αi = 1 and ai = Tk is denoted by
Eγhkiω−iui (Tk, r−ith,ω) and is given by (15).
B. Best Response Strategies
The UDTSs in (13) form a strict subset in the space of all
possible strategies. Hence, it is important to demonstrate that
this subset is sufficient to contain a BR. In this section we
demonstrate that when the set of SUEs Nr {i} is playing
UDTSs, the SUE i can find a BR also within the UDTSs.
Claim 2. For symmetric-independent types, when αi = 1, the
expected utility given in (15) is increasing in λi almost surely.
Proof: Let us consider two exponential random vari-
ables hk1i ∼ Exp (λi1) and hk2i ∼ Exp (λi2), such
that λi1 < λi2. By stochastic coupling [30] hk1i <
hk2i almost surely. Now let us consider the expected
utility conditioned on hki , i.e., Eγω−i|hikui(hki , r−ith,ω)
and observe from (15) that it is increasing in hki . Thus
Eγω−i|hk1i ui
(
hk1i , r−ith,ω
)
< Eγω−i|hk2i ui
(
hk2i , r−ith,ω
)
holds
almost surely. Moreover, from properties of expectation,
the inequality is preserved when expectation is taken on
both sides with respect to hk1i and h
k2
i . By the law
of total expectation, Ehk1i Eγω−i|hk1i ui
(
hk1i , , r−ith,ω
)
=
Eγhkiω−iui (Tk, r−ith,ω). Therefore, (15) is increasing in λi
almost surely.
The expected utility of SUE i when αi = 1 and ai = X is
Eγω−iui (X, r−ith,ω) = ρ. Next we demonstrate the form of
the BR strategy of SUE i when all other SUEs are playing
UDTS r−ith.
Lemma 1. For r−ith and αi = 1, a BR mixed strategy of
player i, denoted by r˜i, is given by
r˜i =

{
Pr (Tk | αi = 1) = pk
Pr (X | αi = 1) = 0 if λi ≥ λith,{
Pr (Tk | αi = 1) = 0
Pr (X | αi = 1) = 1 if λi < λith,
where 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1 are probabilities s.t.,
∑
k∈K pk = 1.
Proof: Let U be an exponential random variable with
mean 1. Since (15) is increasing in λi as proved in Claim 2,
there exists a λith such that for channel k
Eγhkiω−iui (λithU, r−ith,ω) =ρ. (17)
Accordingly, SUE i transmits iff λi ≥ λith. Since the expo-
nential distribution is completely characterized by the mean,
for symmetric-independent types the expected payoff for two
actions ai = Tk and ai = Tk′ k, k′ ∈ K, are equal.
Consequently, if λi ≥ λith at the BR, SUE i may play any
probability distribution (pk, k ∈ K) and obtains the same
expected payoff.
Lemma 1 essentially says that when other SUEs play (13)
the BR of SUE i is any distribution (not necessarily uniform)
over the set of channels, provided that the mean of the channel
power gain is above a threshold. Therefore, player i may as
well play the UDTS rith = λith. Thus we have demonstrated
that the subset of UDTSs is sufficiently large to hold a BR to
itself.
A symmetric threshold is one that is common to all players
and we denote a symmetric UDTS by rsymth = (λth).
For symmetric-independent types and UDTS profile rsymth =
(λth), the event that player i transmits on channel k and the
event that player j transmits on channel k are independent and
have equal probabilities and hence is denoted by
q2 (λth) := qik (λth) , ∀i ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K.
8Eγhki ω−iui (Tk, r−ith,ω) = p¯
k
2 (Nbi r {i})
∑
pk2 (N−bik)
N−bik∈P(N−bi)
p¯k2
(N ′−bik) ˆ
D
fgfγEhki log
(
1 +
hki∑
j∈N−bik
gkj + γk + σ
2
)
dgdγ. (15)
Eγhki ω−iui
(
Tk, r
sym
−ith,ω
)
= p¯sym2 (Nbi r {i})EX
ˆ
D
fgfγEhki log
(
1 +
hki∑
j∈X
gkj + γk + σ
2
)
dgdγ. (16)
Moreover, analogous to (11) the probability that no colli-
sion is encountered by player i on channel k is given by
p¯sym2 (Nbik) := (1− q2 (λth))Nbi−1. Also consequently, the
probability that the subset of SUEsN−bik ⊆ N−bi takes action
Tk follows the binomial distribution B2 (N−bi , q2 (λth)).
Similar to the discussion in Section IV-A, when X ∼
B2 (N−bi , q2 (λth)), the expected utility of SUE i, for action
ai = Tk and r
sym
−ith = (λth) is given by (16) where
∑
j∈X
gkj is
the sum of X number of i.i.d. random variables gkj .
If a BNSE in UDTSs exists, then there must be a unique
λith = λ˜th ∀ i ∈ N that defines a mutual BR rsymth =
(
λ˜th
)
.
That is to say that rsym−ith =
(
λ˜th
)
and λi = λ˜th solves the
following equation:
Eγhki ,ω−iui
(
Tk, r
sym
−ith,ω
)
= ρ. (18)
Theorem 2. For symmetric-independent types and identically
populated cells, G2 has a unique threshold λith = λ˜th ∀ i ∈ N ,
such that the BNSE in UDTSs is given by the profile rsymth =(
λ˜th
)
.
Proof: The method is similar to the proof of Theorem 1,
therefore it is omitted.
Theorem 2 states that when only mean of the CSI is known,
the channel access game can still achieve a BNSE in mixed
threshold strategies. The equilibrium strategy of an SUE i is to
pick a channel uniformly at random if and only if it possesses
a symbol and its mean channel power gain, λi, is above the
threshold λ˜th. This equilibrium strategy is extremely efficient
to implement. Once an SUE obtains ρ, the beliefs, and system
state distributions, it is able to compute the common threshold
λ˜th, without interaction, by solving (18). Such a scheme can
be used for distributed resource allocation in dense SC zones.
Furthermore, in both G1 and G2 the network administrator
may control the number of SUEs that simultaneously transmit,
and thus control collisions, by manipulating the parameter ρ.
The higher the ρ is, the higher the thresholds and therefore
the lesser the probability that an SUE transmits.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Non-symmetric Games
G1 and G2 are symmetric games due to the assumptions
of symmetric types, symmetric MUE load over channels, and
identically populated SCs. The symmetric assumptions hold
for a localized overlapping set of SCs, as justified in the
above development. We identified this cases as a dense SC
zone as depicted in Fig. 1. However, once the SCs are no
longer clustered in localized zones and instead are dispersed
in a larger area, such as the home SCs in a residential area,
the assumption of symmetric independent types does not hold.
That situation gives rise to a non-symmetric game.
The following discussion on non-symmetric case is carried
out with respect to G1. Two levels of asymmetry can be
observed. Firstly asymmetry among UEs and secondly asym-
metry among channels of a given UE. Let us first consider
asymmetry only among UEs. Thus we assume that the channel
power gains are i.i.d. from a given UE to a given BS, i.e., ∀
k ∈ K, gkjm = gjm, but a UE may have nonidentical (yet
independent) channel distributions to different BSs. Also we
keep the assumption that the MUE load is balanced across
the channels. SUEs no longer have identical types nor is the
number of SUEs in SCs identically distributed. Then at the
equilibrium of G1, from (9) there must be thresholds ∀ i ∈ N ,
hith = h˜ith, which are the solution to the system of nonlinear
equations:
Eγθ−iui (hith, s−ith,θ) = ρ, ∀i ∈ N , (19)
where s−ith = (hjth, j ∈ N r {i}) . In the symmet-
ric case this system condensed to a single equation
Eγθ−iui
(
hth, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ. The asymmetric game has a
equilibrium in threshold strategies iff the system (19) has a
solution.
Now let us consider asymmetry among SUEs together with
asymmetry among channels. Then the MUE load need not be
balanced among the channels and the channel power gain from
a SUE to a BS may depend on the channel index. Then for
an equilibrium to exist, we seek K × N threshold values ∀
i ∈ N , hkith = h˜kith, which are the solution to the system of
nonlinear equations:
Eγθ−iuki
(
hkith, s−ith,θ
)
= ρ, ∀i ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, (20)
where s−ith =
(
hkjth, j ∈ N r {i} , k ∈ K
)
and
Eγθ−iuki
(
hkith, s−ith,θ
)
is the expected rate over channel k.
SUE i transmits on the channel with the highest Eγθ−iuki ,
when it has a channel power gain above hkith, else does not
transmit. A general existence result of threshold based NE
for the asymmetric case requires to establish the existence of
a solution to systems (19) or (20) and is not considered in
this paper.
B. Identically Distributed Populations
We have mentioned that the theory developed in this paper
applies to a situation where the population size of the SUEs
in each SC are i.i.d. We carry out the following discuss
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of G1.
with respect to G1, but it applies to G2 as well. Suppose
the cardinality of the set Nbi r {i} , bi ∈ M, given player
i ∈ Nbi exists has probability Pr (Nbi r {i} | {i}) . Let
Pr (N−bi) denote the joint probability of the cardinality of
the sets (Nm′)m′∈Mr{bi} . Then (7) has to be averaged
over conditional distribution of the population given i ex-
ists EN|{i}Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
=
∑
Nbir{i},N−bi Pr(Nbir{i} | {i}) Pr(N−bi)Eγθ−iui(hki , s−ith,θ),where the sum-
mation is over all possible values of cardinalities of
sets Nbi r {i} and N−bi . Then we note that Claim
1 holds when Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
is replaced with
EN|{i}Eγθ−iui
(
hki , s−ith,θ
)
. Then from the i.i.d. assump-
tion of population size among SCs, it is verified that all other
results follow and we find the BNSE in threshold strategies
by solving EN|{i}Eγθ−iui
(
hth, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ.
C. Numerical Results
Let us consider a scenario where, in a hotel lobby, 4 service
providers have deployed 1 SAP each. This scenario is depicted
in Fig. 1. There are K = 8 channels in the uplink and it is
noted when the number changes. The rest of the variables are
as follows: Pr (αi = 1) = 0.9, SINR threshold Γth = 20 dB,
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distribution of MUE interference γ is fγ = δ (γ − 0.001),
where δ (·) is the impulse function, channel power gains hki
and gkim follow exponential distribution with means E
(
hki
)
=
0.5, E
(
gkim
)
= 0.05 respectively ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ k ∈ K, and
m ∈ M, and parameters ρ = 2 bits/s/Hz and noise power
σ2 = 10−6. Recall that the symmetric model assumed i.i.d.
number of SUEs among service providers. For simplicity the
simulation considers 5 SUEs for each service provider with
probability one. The SUEs 1 to 5 belong to SC1 and SUEs 6
to 10 belong to SC2 and so on and so forth.
Fig. 2a depicts (expected rate -ρ) vs. symmetric threshold
hth for SUE 1. The expected rate of an SUE in G1 is
given by (8). The value of hth for which the expected rate
is equal to ρ, is the solution of (12) and defines the unique
equilibrium ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
of G1 according to Theorem 1.
Three SINR thresholds Γth ∈ {5, 10, 20} dB are considered.
As Γth increases, the expected rate (8) decreases since the
probability of violation of SINR threshold increases and hence
the channel power gain required to achieve a rate of ρ increases
leading to a higher equilibrium threshold.
Fig. 2b demonstrates that the root obtained in the Fig 2a is
indeed the equilibrium point. To this end, we let SUE 1 deviate
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from the symmetric equilibrium threshold while all other SUEs
follow the symmetric equilibrium threshold strategy ssym−ith =(
h˜th
)
. As can be seen, SUE 1 is unable to achieve strictly
better performance by unilateral deviation i.e., h1th ≷ h˜th =
0.7.
Next let us consider G2. The simulation setup assumes that
λi is uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 2). The rest of
the simulation parameters are kept the same as in the previous
section. The expected rate of an SUE in G2 is given by (16).
Fig. 3a depicts the (expected rate−ρ) vs. symmetric threshold
λth for SUE 1. It demonstrates the existence and uniqueness
of solution to (18) which defines the symmetric threshold
λ˜th of the mixed BNSE. Observe that as Γth increases, the
mean channel power gain required to achieve an expected rate
of ρ increases according to (18) resulting in a higher λ˜th at
equilibrium.
Fig. 3b demonstrates the payoffs of SUEs as SUE 1 deviates
from the equilibrium threshold value while all other SUEs
follow the equilibrium strategy rsym−ith =
(
λ˜th
)
. For clarity
utilities of only three SUEs are depicted. As expected, SUE 1
is unable to achieve strictly better performance by unilateral
deviation, therefore rsymth =
(
λ˜th
)
defines the NE.
The above results consider a fixed number of SUEs per cell.
Next we consider the effect of the distribution of the number
of users. Let us construct the distribution of cardinality as
follows. Let the maximum number of players in SC m be
Nm > 0 and let each player i have an independent probability
of existence pexist. Then the cardinality of Nbi r {i} has the
binomial distribution with Nbi − 1 trials and pexist success
probability. Similarly the cardinality of N−bi has binomial dis-
tribution with parameters N−bi and pexist. In (8) there are two
values that depend on the distribution of cardinalities Nbir{i}
and N−bi . The probability of no collision p¯sym1 (Nbik) and
the feasible SINR region D, both of which decrease as the
number of SUEs in a cell increases. Thus as pexist grows
the binomial distributions (Nbi − 1, pexist) and (N−bi , pexist) ,
increase the probabilities given to higher cardinalities and thus
the expected utility EN|{i}Eγθ−iui
(
hth, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
, decreases
and therefore the equilibrium threshold hth increases. Fig. 4
shows this phenomenon where as pexist tends to 1 the threshold
approached 0.70 which is the value obtained when all players
exists with probability 1 for Γth = 10 dB in Fig. 2a.
The configurable network parameter available to the admin-
istrator is ρ. It is proven under Theorem 1 that as ρ is increased
the collisions in the network must reduce. Fig. 5 demonstrates
this fact in the simulation environment. To emphasize on
number of collisions, a reduced channel number of K = 4
is used in this simulation.
D. Fairness and Benchmark
As a result of the symmetric-independent types, all SUEs
achieve equal expected utility in both games G1 and G2 at
the equilibrium. Hence, fairness among the SUEs is ensured
by both Games. This can be observed in Fig. 2b and Fig. 3b.
When the thresholds of all SUEs coincide at the equilibrium
threshold, they all achieve equal expected utility.
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In order to compare the system throughput, this paper
implements the benchmark decentralized scheduling scheme
where each SAP schedules its SUE who has a symbol and
has the highest channel power gain. Thus this scheme requires
a message to be sent to the selected SUE of each SC in
each time slot. Then there are no intracell collisions but only
intercell interference. When the scheduled SUEs of the SCs
satisfy the SINR threshold Γth, they achieve the rates given by
(3). While this benchmark scheme is not globally optimal, it is
locally optimal at each SAP to maximize its uplink throughput,
when there is no intercell CSI exchange. We present the
results for CSIT case of the benchmark and the related CSIT
game G1 in Fig. 6. The rate distribution of G1 performs
close to the benchmark. Therefore for a dense SC zone as
in Fig. 1, employing the proposed game models, rather than
the benchmark is reasonable, as the proposed games have the
added advantage of being fully distributed, once the parameter
ρ has been broadcast to the SUEs.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the distributed uplink channel access
problem of a cluster of dense underlay SCs. The analysis
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was carried out using the theory of Bayesian games. The
system model was chosen to be sufficiently general and it
includes multiple cells and channels, intercell interference,
intracell collisions and random symbol availability, which are
important parameters in modeling picocells, femtocells, and
wireless local area networks. Two CSI availability models are
used resulting in two games. The first game, G1 assumes
CSIT and we solve it for pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium.
At the equilibrium each SUE transmits on the highest gain
channel if that gain is above a threshold. The second game,
G2, only assumes statistical CSIT. G2 is proved to possess
an interesting symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium where an
SUE uniformly distributes channel access if mean channel
gains is above a threshold. The two pure- and mixed-strategy
equilibria, are particularly interesting for distributed systems
as at the equilibrium, the best response strategy is defined by a
single threshold parameter and both equilibria can be achieved
without interaction among the SUEs. The key extension that
remains is to explore nonsymmetric equilibria.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Consider the strategy profile ssymth = (hth). Define
the random variable X (hth) ∼ B1 (N−bi , q1 (hth)) and let
z (X (hth) , hth) =
´
D fgfγ log(1 +
hth∑
j∈X(hth) g
k
j + γk + σ
2
dgγ).
Then the expected payoff in (8) is restated
as Eθ−iui
(
h˜th, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= p¯sym1 (Nbi r {i})
EX(hth)z (X (hth) , hth) . Note that z (X (hth) , hth) is
increasing in hth (as the log (·) and integration region
D both grows with hth). Also observe that z (X (hth) , hth)
is decreasing in X (hth) (the number of interfering SUEs
grows as X (hth) increases). We can also observe by (6)
and (10) that q1 (hth) is decreasing in hth. Therefore, if
h1th < h
2
th, then q1
(
h2th
)
< q1
(
h1th
)
. Through stochastic
coupling theory [30] X
(
h2th
)
< X
(
h1th
)
a.s. Therefore,
z
(
X
(
h1th
)
, h1th
)
< z
(
X
(
h2th
)
, h2th
)
a.s. Taking expectations
gives EX(h1th)z
(
X
(
h1th
)
, h1th
)
< EX(h2th)z
(
X
(
h2th
)
, h2th
)
a.s.
From (11) and (6) we observe that the probability of no
collision p¯sym1 (Nbik) is also increasing in hth. Consequently
Eγθ−iui
(
h˜th, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
is increasing in hth. Hence there
exists unique h˜th such that Eγθ−iui
(
h˜th, s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ.
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